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Introduction
The Porter Hypothesis (Porter, 1990 (Porter, , 1991 Here, we extend the analysis carried out by André et al. (2009) assuming Cournot competition between firms at the market stage. The issue of why and when firms choose to be quantity-or price-setting agents has been lively discussed in the theory of industrial organization, pointing out that price (respectively, quantity) competition fits best industries where firms' capacity constraints are absent or loose (resp., tight). 1 This appears to be the case, e.g., in the car industry, where a firm's plant size matters. Additionally, this is a prototypical market where the environmental implications of production are relevant, and the existence of appropriate incentives for investments aimed at the attainment of green product qualities is a hot issue. In fact, casual observation suggests that several large firms like Honda, Toyota and VW-Audi are investing (or are about to invest) massive resources in R&D for clean technologies, without being subject to a specific form of taxation on any brown technology currently in use, which are instead regulated through minimum quality standards (like Euro V). Hence, one is led to think that these efforts must be driven by profit incentives largely -if not altogetherindependent of the regulatory framework. This is precisely the bottom line of our analysis. By replacing Bertrand with Cournot, the resulting softer competition at the market stage delivers the appropriate incentives for firms to standardise the industry onto the green product, in absence of any regulation whatsoever. This opens a perspective that stretches even beyond the Porter Hypothesis, prompting for the investigation of scenarios where firms governed by unconstrained profit incentives may pursue projects ultimately leading to socially efficient outcomes.
The model
We adopt largely the same setup as in André et al. (2009) . We describe a vertically differentiated duopoly under complete information, where singleproduct firms, 1 and 2, decide whether to supply a high-or low-quality good, identified by q H > q L . Quality has both hedonic and environmental features; in particular, while q L involves some undesirable environmental externality, i.e., it is brown, while q H is green. the individual firm's profit function is
where x ij indicates the output level of firm i (hence, in the remainder the first subscript will consistently refer to firm i while the second will refer to the rival). As it appears from (1), the production technology involves variable 3 costs, which are quadratic in the output level:
For the moment, we abstract from any fixed costs related to installed capacity or the R&D effort required for the attainment of either quality level. We Using (1) we may describe three possible cases: either both firms supply the green (resp., brown) standard, so that consumers indeed purchase a homogeneous good, or they opt for different quality levels.
The demand side is as in Mussa and Rosen (1978) 
are to be used under Cournot competition. If instead both firms adopt the same quality standard (either green or brown), demands (3) symmetrically collapse onto:
The interaction between firms is fully noncooperative and takes place in two stages. In the first, firms set their respective quality levels; then, in the second, which is the proper market stage, they compete in outputsà la
Cournot. The solution concept applied is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
The game
To begin with, we have to solve the three possible Cournot subgames. The fastest way to do it is to focus on the case in which firms supply different standards. The first order conditions for profit maximization are:
yielding:
The resulting Cournot-Nash profits are:
The alternative cases where firms symmetrically choose the same standard (either brown or green) obtain from (6-7) by imposing q i = q j . 2 This yields:
Before proceeding any further, it is worth oserving that
entailing that total industry output is strictly higher when both firms adopt the green standard than when they adopt the brown one. The equilibrium price in the symmetric cases writes as follows:
with
so that switching from brown to green qualities brings about an increase in price. Therefore, a priori, if the whole industry increases the quality standard symmetrically, the net effect on consumer surplus is ambiguous, depending upon the balance between the increase in quality and output on one side and the increase in price on the other.
In the general case where firms supply differentiated products, consumer surplus is:
which, in the symmetric cases, becomes:
On this basis, we can formulate:
The symmetric switch from brown to green quality involves an increase in consumer surplus.
This of course is driven by the fact that the balance between the increase in all variables involved is such that consumers are happy to purchase larger amounts of the green variety even if this happens at a higher price.
We are now in a position to investigate the symultaneous choice of the quality level, either H or L, by the two firms. As in André et al. (2009, p. 187), this is described by the reduced-form stage appearing in Matrix 1.
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Matrix 1
The equilibrium analysis can be carried out by assessing the sign of three key inequalities involving the payoffs apeparing in Matrix 1. To begin with, consider the main diagonal, along which we have:
This establishes the superiority of the green standard in terms of the reuslting profit incentives for firms, the explanation being that the higher production costs associated with supplying the green standard rather than the brown one are more than compensated by the corresponding increase in market price generated by consumers' hedonic inclinations.
Then, we move on to consider the inequalities by rows or columns:
Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, we can formulate the following claim:
Proposition 2 Pure profit incentives yield (H, H) as the unique Nash equilibrium at the intersection of strictly dominant strategies, in absence of any form of regulation. The equilibrium outcome is also Pareto-efficient for firms.
That is, the stage game depicted in Matrix 1 is not a prisoners' dilemma.
The source of the spontaneous alignement of firms on the green quality in an unregulated market is to be found in the less aggressive nature of Cournot 
Concluding remarks
We have revisited the vertically differentiated duopoly model by André et al.
(2009) under quantity-setting behaviour, to highlight the striking fact that softening market competition may have far-reaching consequences as far as the environmental performance of the industry is concerned. Indeed, our simple model is something more than a vindication of the Porter Hypothesis, as it shows that private and social incentives towards the adoption of green technologies may in fact be reciprocally aligned.
